

**CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT**

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FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE TWO-HUNDRED AND TWENTY-EIGHTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 31 August 1965, at 10.30 a.m.

OF DISARMAMENT
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COLLECTION

Chairman:

Mr. V.C. TRIVEDI

(India)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. A. CORREA do LAGO
Mr. D. SILVEIRA da MOTA

Bulgaria:

Mr. C. LUKANOV
Mr. Y. GOLEMANOV
Mr. T. DAMIANOV
Mr. G. YANKOV

Burma:

U SAIN BWA
U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS
Mr. S.F. RAE
Mr. J.A. BEESLEY
Mr. C. J. MARSHALL

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. Z. CERNIK
Mr. V. VAJNAR
Mr. R. KLEIN
Mr. F. DOBIAS

Ethiopia:

Lij M. IMRU
Mr. A. ZELLEKE
Mr. T. BEKELE

India:

Mr. V.C. TRIVEDI
Mr. K.P. LUKOSE
Mr. K.P. JAIN
Mr. B. AHMED

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI
Mr. E. GUIDOTTI
Mr. S. AVETTA
Mr. G.P. TOZZOLI

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

Mexico:

Mr. A. GOMEZ ROBLEDO

Mr. M. TELLO MACIAS

Nigeria:

Mr. L.C.N. OBI

Mr. O.O. ODESOLA

Poland:

Mr. J. GOLDBLAT

Mr. E. STANIEWSKI

Mr. A. SKOWRONSKI

Mr. H. PAC

Romania:

Mr. V. DUMITRESCU

Mr. E. GLASER

Mr. C. UNGUREANU

Mr. I. MINZATU

Sweden:

Mrs. A. MYRDAL

Mr. P. HAMMARSKJOLD

Mr. B. VEGESACK

Mr. U. ERICSSON

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN

Mr. Y.M. VORONTSOV

Mr. G.K. EFIMOV

United Arab Republic:

Mr. A.F. HASSAN

Mr. A. OSMAN

Mr. M. KASSEM

Mr. S. IBRAHIM

United Kingdom:

Lord CHALFONT

Sir Harold BEELEY

Mr. J.G. TAHOURDIN

Miss E.J.M. RICHARDSON

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

United States of America:

Mr. W.C. FOSTER

Mr. D.S. MACDONALD

Mr. W.A. HAYNE

Special Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. D. PROTITCH

The CHAIRMAN (India): I declare open the two hundred and twenty-eighth meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. OBI (Nigeria): As this is my first intervention since our resumption, permit me, Mr. Chairman, first of all to extend our belated though none the less hearty welcome to those of our colleagues, like yourself, Lord Chalfont, Mr. Cernik and Mr. Goldblat, amongst others, who are joining us for the first time or are returning to our midst. You, Mr. Chairman, are of course no stranger to us, and we recall very clearly your brief appearance last year and the powerful and lucid statement which you made on that occasion (ENDC/PV.174, pp.10 et seq.) I recall also with satisfaction your valuable contributions, both then and during the recently-completed session of the Disarmament Commission, and the co-operation which has always existed between us. I have no doubt that with your well-known drive, wisdom and intelligence our quest for peace and disarmament will be considerably furthered.

The Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament has at last resumed its work. Needless to say, my delegation is pleased with this development. Indeed, we were not happy -- as we made clear at the time -- that it was impossible for the Committee to reconvene much earlier. Our regret stems from the fact, amongst other things, that just before we adjourned last September we were tackling, in what at last seemed to be realistic fashion, some of the problems confronting us in this Committee.

Members of the Committee will recall that during our negotiations last year there were indications that at last detailed consideration in depth of the various problems connected with the elimination of nuclear delivery vehicles would be undertaken in an appropriate working organ. My delegation was heartened by this apparent evolution and, to assist the two sides towards reaching agreement on suitable terms of reference for the working group, we proposed a formula which is contained in the working document tabled by us (ENDC/136). My delegation is still of the view that the time has come when the problems connected with nuclear delivery vehicles should be considered in an appropriate working body. We still feel that such a body should be established without any unnecessary preconditions, but at the same time we feel that the establishment of the working group should not be a mere procedural affair -- that is,

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just the transference of the discussion from one forum to the other. Clear-cut, criteria and precise terms of reference, which may well impinge even upon substance, are necessary. After all, we have now been considering the problems of nuclear delivery vehicles for over three years.

In our consideration of this problem -- which is the centrepiece of the treaty on general and complete disarmament that we are striving so hard to elaborate -- we appeared to be on the threshold of a meeting of minds between the two sides. My delegation hopes that by not meeting for such a long time we have not lost momentum in so far as the consideration of this subject is concerned; and we hope that the Committee will take up the subject with vigour, imagination and a spirit of accommodation at an early and appropriate time. It is, as is well known, a subject in which my delegation is very keenly interested. Indeed, on the question of general and complete disarmament generally it is our view that, while we might concentrate on any of the collateral measures which seems promising, it should not be to the complete exclusion of elaborating a treaty on general and complete disarmament. That remains our common goal, and we should continue nibbling at the problems involved.

My delegation also derives considerable satisfaction from the fact that, even though our Committee was in recess for a long time, the problem of disarmament was not entirely neglected. Thanks to the initiative of the Soviet Union, and also to the Member Governments of the United Nations which did not oppose the move, the United Nations Disarmament Commission, which had not met since 1960, was convened. As we pointed out in New York, this was a welcome move, the more so as the difficulties confronting the United Nations General Assembly during its last session did not make it possible for the First Committee to meet and consider the problems connected with disarmament.

Furthermore, as members of the Committee are aware, there were, just before the nineteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly, many initiatives from the highest levels which had and still have a positive bearing on disarmament. I refer, of course, to the two declarations made by the Heads of State or Government of the

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Organization of African Unity in Cairo, and by those of the Non-Aligned Countries at their second gathering, also in Cairo, last year (A/5763). As it was not possible to consider these initiatives at the nineteenth session of the General Assembly, the Disarmament Commission provided a most welcome and useful forum for the purpose.

Indeed it appeared to us that, possibly because the Commission had only disarmament and related measures on its agenda and had considerably more time and undivided attention to devote to this than the First Committee of the General Assembly usually has, the deliberations were more far-reaching than previous similar discussions on disarmament. Many resolutions were tabled in the Commission, including such important resolutions as those bearing on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons (DC/225; ENDC/149) and on a world disarmament conference (DC/224; ENDC/149), the latter of which we do not propose to discuss here, as it is a matter for the General Assembly primarily, although we would express anew our satisfaction that it was adopted by an overwhelming majority. Even without the two resolutions which were eventually passed and which on the whole reflected, so to speak, a common denominator, what a vast majority of the United Nations Membership thought of our performance was clear from the proceedings of the Commission. Moreover, a clear pattern emerged from the discussions indicating to which of the various measures with which our Committee is inundated the representatives of the world attach the greatest importance and priority.

Undoubtedly the subject on which the greatest universal concern was expressed in the Commission was that of a comprehensive test ban. It is now over two years since the Moscow partial test-ban Treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1) was signed with a great fanfare. The Preamble to that Treaty clearly stated as one of its objectives "the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time". Last year we in this Committee celebrated the anniversary of the signature of the Treaty with some fanfare, and this year we made another pilgrimage to this shrine, making the usual noises -- "a dedication" or "rededication of ceaseless efforts", etc. A casual observer of our proceedings could be pardoned if, hearing all these declarations, he said in the manner of the younger and more sceptical of the Goldfinch brothers: "I have heard that before."

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I dare say; tell me something new." Even some of us who have been privileged to participate in the negotiations sometimes cannot help wondering how long humanity, like Prince Hamlet, can be fed on this "chameleon's dish ... promise-crammed" (Hamlet, Act III, Sc.2).

This Committee, the United Nations General Assembly, and indeed every international conference of significance dealing with peace and security, have been seized of this subject for many years. Indeed, it is the area to which the eight non-aligned delegations have addressed themselves with the greatest vigour, determination and imagination in the search for acceptable compromises and from which they have in fact come out jointly with a few suggestions. I do not intend to deal in detail with those suggestions, but I am sure my colleagues will forgive me if I draw attention to some of the views expressed by my delegation either alone or in conjunction with others.

My colleagues will recall that my delegation took a very early opportunity during the negotiations last year to draw the attention of the Committee to this question (ENDC/PV.159, pp.9 et seq.). It also made certain concrete suggestions such as that for the extension of the Moscow partial test-ban Treaty to include the banning of all underground tests above a threshold to be determined by agreement -- that is, an agreement to cover those tests above a magnitude at which they can be detected and identified without any international verification (ENDC/PV.187, p.35). My delegation called for a reactivation of the Nuclear Sub-Committee to explore this interim measure and evaluate the latest technical data so as to facilitate agreement on a full and comprehensive treaty with, if possible, scientific experts participating as well so that really productive negotiations might result (DC/PV.78, p.11 of the provisional text). We also pleaded with the nuclear Powers to make available the results of the research carried out by them over the past year or so in that field, about which we had heard so much. At this point I hope I may be permitted to express my regret that, while we have heard so much about the vast sums spent on research in this field, we have heard so little about the progress thus far achieved.

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In addition to the above, my delegation joined with the other seven non-aligned delegations to table two memoranda, in April 1962 (ENDC/28) and September 1964 (ENDC/145), which in our view provided considerable ground for constructive negotiations resulting in agreement among the nuclear Powers. Finally, I should like to draw the attention of the Committee to the memorandum on the question of the cessation of nuclear weapon tests tabled by the three African delegations -- Ethiopia, Nigeria and the United Arab Republic -- on 10 June 1963. In operative paragraph 1 of that document the three delegations noted that:

"They are firmly convinced that the nuclear Powers can agree to end all further nuclear testing, under satisfactory and safeguarded conditions, in the immediate future. Present day circumstances, as well as technical, military and economic considerations, all favour the immediate conclusion of a test-ban treaty. The positions of the nuclear Powers have never been closer than at present. The whole world has pinned its hopes on the sense of wisdom and practicality of the nuclear Powers. The world will not understand or condone their failure to bridge the residual final gap on such a vital and far-reaching issue as the cessation of nuclear tests." (ENDC/94)

If I have touched on some of these proposals, it is not merely to show that the reason for the nuclear Powers not reaching agreement in this field is not the absence of constructive suggestions on the part of the non-aligned delegations, either singly or collectively. The reason for my drawing attention to them is that in our view some of those proposals still retain some validity and could therefore profitably be re-examined by the nuclear Powers either in this Committee, in the more restricted Nuclear Sub-Committee, or in some other convenient forum.

Meanwhile we observe that there has been no basic change of principle in the approach of the two sides to this question. Although there are welcome hints that its demands will be more reasonable and fewer than those of two years ago owing to continuing satisfactory progress in its research in the field of detection and identification, the West still continues to insist on a number of on-site inspections.

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If I remember correctly, at one time the West insisted on seven on-site inspections as well as a strengthening of detection and identification capabilities by the construction of seven automatic seismic stations in its territory and that of the Soviet Union respectively.

On the other hand, for a brief period in the winter of 1962-63 the Soviet Union agreed as an act of political compromise to accept three on-site inspections and three automatic seismic stations on its territory. It is true that the Soviet Union later withdrew that offer. At this point may I remind the Committee once more that, before the Soviet withdrawal of that offer, however, and to help bridge what seemed to be a rather small gap -- one could almost say a matter of numbers, even though a fundamental difference of principle was discernible in the positions of the two sides -- various suggestions were made by the non-aligned delegations? Among these was one made by certain delegations and formally developed by the three African delegations in the memorandum which I have already mentioned and which states:

"It may very well be that science may, in the future, show beyond doubt that on-site inspections may no longer be needed to identify suspicious seismic events or to adequately control a test-ban treaty. For the time being, however, the 3 African delegations recognize that three, four or so, yearly truly effective inspections -- or an adequately proportionate figure spread over more years -- may be needed to dispel mutual suspicions, to help build up confidence between the nuclear Powers, and, no less importantly, to facilitate their reaching a practical political settlement." (ibid., pp.2-3)

The representative of Sweden, in her customarily lucid and excellent statement on 10 August this year, revived a similar idea as a possible solution (ENDC/PV.222, p.18).

My delegation is of the opinion that the main obstacle in the way of agreement on a comprehensive test-ban treaty is to a very high degree political -- indeed, so political as to make the technical obstacles which may well exist almost insignificant in comparison. It seems to us that what is lacking perhaps is political will on both sides -- and I repeat both sides -- to reach agreement on this measure. Or is it that the nuclear Powers do not see anything to gain from such an agreement? Let us be frank about this. If the Soviet Union at one point of time could agree to accept three on-site inspections as an act of political compromise and without wavering in its conviction and declaration that this was not necessary technically -- I repeat, if the Soviet Union could do that at one time -- we honestly do not see any reason why, if it really desires agreement as we are convinced it does, it cannot do so again.

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At the same time, we confess ourselves to be not fully convinced, to put it very mildly, by most of the arguments of the West concerning the necessity for verification arrangements additional to those provided by national control networks. It is conceivable, I grant, that not all tests, and particularly very small tests, can be detected and identified by national control networks; but is it really the intention of the West to be perfectionist in its approach to this problem? Is it a lone test that counts, or a series of tests? And, if a series, what are the chances of a series of tests -- even in the low kiloton range and even in alluvium and by means of such expensive methods as decoupling -- being conducted without being detected? In short, would it be worth while, even from a military point of view, to test under such difficult conditions? Does the West truly believe that the Soviet Union would cheat on such a matter even in the present position of relatively little confidence in each other? These are questions which have been perturbing our minds, and we should appreciate answers to at least some of them.

We know that to the Soviet Union the expression "on-site inspection" is anathema. We know also that for the West the expression "agreement without on-site inspection" equally is anathema. Unfortunately the positions of both sides have hardened almost to positions of principle, and for us such principles are anathema. My delegation refuses to consider this problem as intractable, and accordingly demands an immediate solution. We do so not only because the United Nations Disarmament Commission instructed us to seek such an agreement with a sense of urgency, but also because we see the very life of the partial test-ban Treaty, to which we attach the utmost significance, threatened.

What moral right have the nuclear Powers, one might ask, to expect the rest of the world not to seek to acquire nuclear weapons when they continue to test underground with almost cynical contempt for United Nations resolutions? What right have the major nuclear Powers, one might again ask, to expect others not to test, even though it be in the atmosphere, while they, the nuclear Powers, continue underground testing -- an expense which they can afford? These are questions which could be raised and, as we know, some countries have not only raised them but have used them as an excuse to test in the most dangerous environment -- for health, that is.

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We have never seen the partial test-ban Treaty as in any way legalizing underground tests. United Nations resolutions have consistently condemned all tests, and operative paragraph 2 of the United Nations General Assembly resolution 1762 A (XVII) unequivocally demanded the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests as from 1 January 1963. The fact that no delegation of a country which had been testing underground voted for this paragraph of the resolution at the time could not in our view be used as a plea in extenuation of a continuation of any form of test. One might as well condone the tests made by those countries which refused to sign the partial test-ban Treaty. We vehemently reject such approaches to the issue and condemn all nuclear weapon tests, no matter who carries them out and in whatever environment or circumstances.

I make no apology for being so brutally frank in this matter, for not only are there vital issues at stake here but Nigeria, which has absolutely no nuclear ambitions, and indeed cannot afford the luxury of even indulging in the mere contemplation of such an ambition, and therefore is in a good position to speak her mind, would be shirking her responsibility if she failed to do so.

We have heard of so-called military risks which are involved in such an agreement; although we have also noted that opinion is much divided, even within countries, about whether any real gains would be made in the highly improbable event of an evasion of the treaty provisions. But have the great nuclear Powers considered the vast political risks involved in not having an agreement, especially in so far as non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is concerned? For instance: are the nuclear Powers not aware that the easiest way to weaken the position of those governments which -- even though they could do so -- have so far valiantly resisted the mounting pressures in their countries to test and acquire nuclear weapons, is to continue tests, even if only underground tests? After all, to the average man -- and this is what a democratic government has to defer to in the long run -- the continued penetration and poisoning of the atmosphere, the disembowelling of the earth and the manufacturing of artificial earthquakes by atomic explosions are manifestations of the armaments race in its most obvious forms. All these would create a sense of insecurity amongst peoples, making them compel their governments to search for an admittedly nebulous security by acquiring or seeking to acquire nuclear weapons.

In the face of all these serious consequences we are therefore forced to say to the nuclear Powers, "Let us help you to help yourselves, and let us help you to help those non-nuclear Powers which are or will be under great pressure to become nuclear Powers. Let us take a step in this direction by concluding an agreement banning all

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nuclear weapon tests -- including, of course, underground tests." Many suggestions have been made to assist the great nuclear Powers reach agreement, and I have drawn attention to some of these. We therefore say to the great nuclear Powers, "Take another look at these suggestions, make your minds more receptive to fresh ideas, do not be over-preoccupied with your so-called national security problems which in real terms may prove of dubious value." We appeal to the nuclear Powers to try to understand each other's positions and difficulties -- and we are not unaware that there are formidable elements in certain countries which are vehemently opposed not only to any such agreement but also to any relaxation of the international situation. We say to the great nuclear Powers, "Be great not only in your military might but in a broader sense of the word; and where a magnanimous act of political compromise could be helpful, be not found wanting in this regard, or humanity will hold you to be equally guilty in making agreement impossible."

We are, however, strongly opposed to any unnecessary demands, especially when they appear to smack of an attempt to establish a nebulous principle. There is too much at stake. If the dialogue which I hope will be undertaken by the two sides discloses that for either technical or political reasons some on-site inspection is necessary, we are convinced that a series of perhaps four or five inspections spread over three years, which in a way was suggested in the three-Power memorandum tabled by Ethiopia, Nigeria and the United Arab Republic (ENDC/94), would not harm the security of any country. On the one hand it would, we hope, satisfy the demands of one side whilst not breaking the back of the other. We fervently hope that an agreement will be concluded very quickly. It is already long overdue, and every moment of delay sows a seed to undermine such an agreement.

Meanwhile, we request that all tests -- including underground tests -- should cease forthwith and that all nuclear and testing Powers abide by the provisions of operative paragraph 2 of the United Nations General Assembly resolution 1762 A (XVII), to which I have already referred.

I shall now pass on to a subject which I have already touched on lightly and which was also referred to our Committee by the United Nations Disarmament Commission for urgent attention. I refer, of course, to an agreement to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. This subject, which has featured on the agenda of the United Nations for many years now, like the test-ban question with which it is linked, received a detailed and, if I may say so, more realistic consideration at the Disarmament Commission than it had in the past.

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Representatives will no doubt recall that on 24 January 1964 my delegation stated:

"An agreement to prevent the further proliferation of nuclear weapons is an ever-obvious necessity, and every moment of delay increases both the difficulty of reaching such an agreement and the danger that more countries will acquire control of those weapons." (ENDC/PV.159, p.15)

Although we derive no satisfaction from the fact, there is no doubt that time has proved the correctness of our forebodings. In the first place, yet another country has joined the nuclear-device testing club and is seriously embarking on an acquisition of full nuclear capability. Whilst it is yet too early to evaluate the impact of this development on the universal effort to contain the nuclear armaments race and to inhibit the area of nuclear infection, it would, however, in our view be wrong to attribute our present woes and difficulties solely to this development. After all, the test by the Chinese was not unexpected. There is no doubt, however, that it is now much more difficult to reach agreement on a non-proliferation measure, and perhaps even more to obtain universal adherence to such a treaty should one ever be concluded.

But, as I have hinted, this should not be attributed to the Chinese tests nor glibly explained away, as is too often the case, as a desire on the part of non-nuclear Powers to acquire added prestige. At this point may I observe that I was very pleased to find that the representative of the United States, Mr. Foster, in his excellent analysis of the problems in the periodical Foreign Affairs (July 1965, Vol.43, No.4, p.587), did not fall into this error? If I may say so, this article by Mr. Foster marks the first time that a very important official of the government of any of the major Powers -- even if in a somewhat unofficial capacity -- has attempted, and in my opinion most successfully, to evaluate certain fundamental problems in an honest and realistic manner and has demonstrated a remarkable understanding of the fears of others.

For there are fears, genuine fears, which many non-nuclear Powers entertain; and the nuclear Powers must recognize them to be genuine and must take appropriate remedial action. It would be wrong to assume that when States seek nuclear weapons they only seek prestige or, in other words, a seat at the high table. There might well be such an element in the calculations of certain States, but I think that largely what would drive non-nuclear States to acquire or seek to acquire nuclear weapons would be a search for the maximum possible security.

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One could argue -- and this is the official position of my Government -- that the acquisition of nuclear weapons per se does not increase the security of States and that non-nuclear States, especially those like Nigeria which require all their resources for the development of their economy, would be well advised not to embark on a course so fraught with danger and hardship. Nevertheless it is not difficult to conceive of a situation in which a country would be under great pressure from its population to acquire nuclear weapons in the belief that that would make them more secure from external threats or from the fear of such threats.

We must recognize the fact that many States are feeling increasingly insecure and uneasy as a result of certain actions by the great Powers which happen also to be nuclear Powers. Within the past decade we have had at least four instances of unilateral military intervention in small States in which some of the great Powers were unfortunately involved, if they were not the sole perpetrators thereof. Such actions have ranged from those with a semblance of legality to the crude operation of the law of the jungle in international affairs. The point I am driving at is that, in their conduct of international affairs, instances have not been lacking where the great Powers have not apparently shown sufficient restraint and have unfortunately acted in what seemed to be a somewhat cynical disregard of the norms of international law and morality. As a result, small countries are not sure that their sovereignty would remain inviolate or that, by sheer force of arms, they would not be compelled by the great Powers to do or not to do this or that.

The situation becomes the more unsettling for the world as a whole and the smaller States in particular when our only machinery -- the United Nations -- is not yet in a position to thwart any aggressive designs or interference by great Powers in the internal affairs of smaller States. To make matters worse, the credibility of alliances and friendship agreements or understandings amongst States is also somewhat in doubt. We have had two instances in the past where the small Power has more or less been abandoned by its big friend in the face of a possible confrontation with another big Power. Of course, it is a good thing for the world that such a collision among the nuclear giants was avoided once in the past, and we hope it will be avoided again. The world cannot afford such a collision, especially if the sparks from the clashing of the mailed fists might ignite the world. Nevertheless it seems to be a fact that the small Power just cannot be sure that it will not be the victim of unprovoked

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aggression or unwanted interference in its internal affairs, backed by force of arms, or that, if it were so threatened, its ally, friend, ideological brother or what you will, would come to the rescue.

I have made this point at such length because I think that there is usually a tendency to consider the desire on the part of non-nuclear States to acquire nuclear weapons as an attempt by them to enhance their prestige. There is also the tendency to consider a non-proliferation agreement as a panacea. One sometimes gets the impression from listening to some of the great Powers that all will be well if only one can get an agreement to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

To the nuclear Powers, therefore, the only obstacle to a real solution of the problem is the present difference of opinion between the giant military blocs on certain issues. I would submit, with all due respect, that this is a rather myopic conception of the situation. Of course, if we do get an agreement on non-proliferation there will be another stampede to sign it, as was the case with the Moscow partial test-ban Treaty, although it might conceivably have considerably fewer adherents. Let us make no mistake about it: no country will remain for ever bound, and indeed will only remain so bound for other reasons, --

- (a) Unless and until the great Powers act responsibly with the tremendous power which is at the moment at their disposal. They should neither indulge in nuclear blackmail of smaller States nor threaten their sovereignty with conventional arms. I cannot over-emphasize the need for responsible political action on the part of States, and in particular of the great Powers. Such responsible action would reassure small States more than any paper agreements and thereby go a long way towards blunting the desire to acquire nuclear weapons.
- (b) Unless and until the United Nations is developed sufficiently to safeguard and guarantee the territorial integrity of States.
- (c) Unless and until the use of nuclear weapons is outlawed or, at the least, the nuclear Powers give a categorical assurance that they will in no circumstances whatever use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States and that even against each other they will not be the first to use them.

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- (d) Unless and until a freeze of all production of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery is made -- that is, serious effort is made towards nuclear containment.
- (e) Unless and until serious effort is made to halt and reverse the armaments race in general, with particular reference to the nuclear arsenals of the nuclear Powers.

Let us not make any mistake about it: as long as States feel threatened, and unless and until the nuclear Powers take positive steps to allay their fears, it will be impossible to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, and vain to think that any agreement could in the long run stop it. From the consideration of this measure over the years I have noticed a somewhat unrealistic assumption that all the obligations should be assumed by the non-nuclear Powers. In fact the responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear Powers should be as great, and in certain respects greater. We therefore welcome the views expressed by Mr. Foster when he wrote --

"Considering the lateness of the hour, the incentives that presently exist for the acquisition of nuclear weapons, and the prospect that they may be acquired with increasing ease, one is forced to conclude that a really major effort involving many kinds of actions will be required if there is to be any reasonable prospect of stemming the tide. These must include actions both to make the acquisition of nuclear capabilities more difficult and to reduce the incentives to acquire them." (Foreign Affairs, July 1965, Vol.43, No.4, pp.591-2).

This is a sober and realistic appraisal of our predicament, and one with which we entirely agree.

My delegation suggested in New York and earlier in Cairo that, pending an agreement between the nuclear Powers on the elimination of nuclear delivery vehicles, starting with bomber aircraft -- or as part of such an agreement -- an agreement should be concluded immediately --

- "(a) to prevent nuclear Powers from transferring such aircraft to non-nuclear Powers in the form of a gift or a loan and --
 - (b) to prevent non-nuclear Powers from acquiring such aircraft, either by purchase or as gifts from the nuclear Powers."
- (DC/PV.78, p.22 of the provisional text).

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We feel that such a measure would, if adopted, make the acquisition of nuclear capabilities by non-nuclear Powers more difficult -- the point well made by Mr. Foster as quoted above --, and we therefore hope that this measure will receive the support of all delegations represented here and in New York. We also hope that the nuclear Powers will make the type of major effort which Mr. Foster, in his excellent exposé, recognizes as indispensable in any realistic approach to the problem of non-proliferation.

I hope it will not come as a great surprise to my colleagues if, after all I have said earlier, we still declare our fullest support for an agreement on non-proliferation. There is no basic contradiction between our full support for such an agreement and our conviction that in the final analysis, and to sustain both that and other agreements, such as a test-ban treaty, certain additional measures and actions on the part of the great Powers are necessary. We recognize that there is a point at which an agreement on non-proliferation and even on a test ban would collapse unless certain additional steps were taken. This, however, should not prevent us from taking the first step; and the type of non-proliferation agreement we have been discussing is only such a first step -- part of a whole wider field.

To our mind a non-proliferation agreement, even of the limited and isolated type we are considering, would be like buying time; and time is of the essence -- time for the nuclear Powers to reassure the non-nuclear Powers that they have nothing to fear from their stockpiling of nuclear weapons; time to enable the nuclear Powers to understand each other more, to reduce the huge element of mistrust at the moment existing, so as to make it possible for them to co-operate with each other and the United Nations in the maintenance of international peace and security and the promotion of disarmament; time to build up the peace-keeping machinery of the United Nations; and, finally, time for the nuclear Powers to demonstrate their seriousness of purpose by undertaking measures which would gradually divest them of their nuclear capabilities, which is the only thing that could reasonably assure the non-nuclear Powers that they would not be subjected to any nuclear blackmail.

Because we feel strongly that no effort should be spared in the search for adequate measures to stop the spread of nuclear weapons, no matter how tentative and limited, we listened with rapt attention and interest to the Italian idea on this

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subject as enunciated by the Italian Foreign Minister, Mr. Fanfani (ENDC/PV.219, pp.17 et seq.). We not only warmly welcome this initiative but are also prepared to give it our support when appropriately developed. It is also because we fully support an agreement on non-proliferation, even of a limited type, and in spite of our doubts of its long-term effectiveness, that we welcome the draft treaty on the subject tabled by Mr. Foster on 17 August 1965 (ENDC/152).

Members of the Committee may recall that on 3 September 1964 my delegation made the following statement:

"As we have indicated in the past, we have noted the obstacles allegedly in the way of agreement on this measure" ---
that is, non-proliferation --

" -- notably the differences of view on the proposed NATO multilateral nuclear force. Our views on this can be found in the verbatim record of the meeting to which I have referred." (ENDC/PV.213, p.15)

That was a reference to pages 14 et seq. of ENDC/PV.176, and the statements in question are also to be found in the verbatim records of the Disarmament Commission of 11 May 1965 (DC/PV.78, pp.2 et seq. of the provisional text). I went on at the meeting of this Committee held on 3 September 1964 to say:

"We are of the opinion that, in spite of these difficulties, serious negotiations for the purpose of reaching an agreement should be begun.

In this connexion we should consider it most helpful if either or both of the two super-Powers would provide, as a basis for negotiations, a draft treaty containing all the elements they consider to be absolutely necessary in such an agreement." (ENDC/PV.213, p.15)

My delegation is therefore very pleased that at least one side has responded to our invitation and has put its ideas on non-proliferation in concrete form. We shall give the draft treaty the careful study which it deserves, taking into account at the same time the comments made on the draft by the other members of the Western Alliance and the reaction of other delegations to it.

Without going into the substance of the draft at this stage, I should like to raise a minor question of procedure but one which in our opinion involves somewhat a question of principle. In article V of the draft it is stated that the Governments

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of the United Kingdom, the United States of America and the Soviet Union would be the Depositary Governments, while the treaty itself would be registered by the Depositary Governments with the United Nations pursuant to article 102 of the United Nations Charter.

Now although we have no objection to the signing and depositing of the treaty, should one be agreed to, in the three countries specified, we wonder whether the United Nations could be brought into the picture even much earlier and more closely than thus far envisaged in the present draft. Are there any legal or political difficulties connected with signing and depositing such a treaty at the United Nations, at least in addition to the three countries specified? We should welcome the clarification of the United States and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on this matter. Meanwhile we shall proceed with our study of the draft and make our detailed comments in due course.

The Committee is required to report to the United Nations General Assembly during its twentieth session. I trust we shall have something positive and encouraging to report. Those of us who were in New York early this year do not need to be reminded of the great disappointment and concern expressed at the lack of progress made by the Committee. It would be idle, either here or in New York, to apportion blame or to say who or what was responsible for this lack of progress. There is, however, no reason, if the political will is there, why agreement could not be reached even now on at least the two subjects which I have dealt with in considerable detail and which our Committee was instructed by the Disarmament Commission to take up with a sense of urgency. My delegation, for its part, pledges its fullest co-operation and assistance to make this possible.

Finally, I should like to take this opportunity to offer the hearty congratulations of my delegation to Lt.-Col. Gordon Cooper and Lt.-Commander Charles Conrad of the United States on their recent achievement. This is the latest in a series of feats by both the United States and the Soviet Union in their attempt to conquer outer space. We marvel at these feats; but before we in my delegation find ourselves completely lost in admiration at such technological prowess, we should like to express the fervent hope that outer space will continue to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and that the technological prowess demonstrated by the two super-Powers in outer space will be matched by the political wisdom of their leaders here on good Mother Earth.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): Already a month has elapsed since the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament resumed its work. During that time most of the delegations have expressed their views and ideas and stated their positions, and now we can already form a definite idea of what the parties came with to the Committee after the long recess in its work and what initial conclusions can be drawn, bearing in mind the prospects for further negotiations on the problems of disarmament and the limitation of the arms race.

The delegations of the socialist countries came to the Committee with concrete positive proposals, the substance and nature of which are fully in keeping with the interests of a rapid and radical easing of the existing international tension -- a matter of particular urgency in view of the aggressive actions of the United States in Indo-China and other parts of the world -- as well as with the interests of averting the danger of a nuclear war and of any war of aggression in general.

Indeed, the programme put forward by the socialist countries (A/5827 and Corr.1) provides for the immediate implementation of such measures as the liquidation of foreign military bases on the territories of other countries and the withdrawal of foreign troops therefrom; the prevention of the dissemination of nuclear weapons, whether through national ownership or through the creation of a NATO multilateral nuclear force or any similar force whereby the West German revanchists would be given access to nuclear weapons; the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons; the establishment of denuclearized zones in various parts of the world and in the first place in Central Europe, where the armed forces of the two major military groupings of States confront each other directly; as well as for other measures, including those mentioned in the Statement of the Government of the German Democratic Republic dated 9 August 1965 and addressed to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC/151).

In the statements of the delegations of the non-aligned States there could be heard a note of anxiety in connexion with the dangerous development of events in the international arena -- "wars on foreign continents", to use the words of the representative of Sweden, Mrs. Myrdal, at the meeting of the Committee held on 10 August (ENDC/PV.222, p.12). This legitimate anxiety could be distinctly heard also in the statement of the representative of Mexico, Mr. Robledo, who said:

"... the present circumstances, and especially the vertiginous escalation of military operations in the most dangerous geographical areas, certainly do not provide the climate of moderation and cordiality which international negotiations normally require".

(ENDC/PV.224, p.29)

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The representatives of the non-aligned countries have raised very pointedly the question of the urgent need to put an end to the terrible threat to the whole of mankind which nuclear weapons involve. The general spirit pervading the statements of the representatives of the non-aligned countries, the considerations they have put forward which testify to the further development of their views on the questions under discussion, and the concrete proposals of the non-aligned States -- even though it may not be possible to agree with everything they said -- deserve attention and careful study.

Unfortunately, a different spirit pervaded the statements of the representatives of the Western Powers. They are trying to turn our negotiations as far as possible away from the alarming events of actual reality caused by the military adventures of the United States in foreign lands, and to direct the work of the Committee into the channel of academic leisurely discussion in order to avoid the just and necessary criticism of the policy pursued by the United States, which is aimed at suppressing the national liberation movements of the peoples who are striving to cast off the yoke of imperialistic oppression, at giving the West German revanchists access to nuclear weapons, and at further intensifying the nuclear arms race.

The most important task of the Committee is still the speediest possible drafting of a treaty on general and complete disarmament providing for the unconditional prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons and the elimination, in the earliest stage of disarmament, of the danger of the unleashing and waging of a nuclear missile war. That is the starting-point of the Soviet delegation in proposing that we reach agreement on the key questions of general and complete disarmament and take important and decisive steps in that direction.

The importance of solving the problem of general and complete disarmament is also recognized by the delegations of the non-aligned countries. Thus, in the statement made by the representative of the United Arab Republic on 17 August, it was pointed out that -

"... we still believe that the main mandate assigned to us by the General Assembly is to draft a treaty on general and complete disarmament under international control". (ENDC/PV.224, p.7)

The representative of India, Mr. Trivedi, stated on 12 August that -

"... in the disarmament field our objective is to achieve, in a spirit of mutual compromise and accommodation, a situation under which the 'haves' reduce their war arsenals and eventually become 'have-nots' ". .

(ENDC/PV.223, p.19)

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Mr. Trivedi also mentioned the agreement of India with the Soviet proposal (ENDC/2/Rev.1/Add.1) -

"... designed to reduce the existing nuclear delivery vehicles to the lowest minimum level in the first stage of disarmament". (ibid., p.12)

The representative of Mexico, Mr. Robledo, rightly pointed out that -

"Two, and only two, roads today are open to mankind -- one leading to peace on the only possible basis, general and complete disarmament, the other continuing the present arms race and leading straight to destruction or, to be altogether precise, to annihilation.

"As this is undeniably evident to us, the voice of Mexico cannot remain silent whenever such a grave, immense and urgent question comes up in any forum in which Mexico is represented". (ENDC/PV.224, p.29)

As for the Western representatives, they have confined themselves to very scanty remarks on the question of general and complete disarmament. The representative of the United States, Mr. Foster, in his first statement, made on 27 July, did not touch upon this question at all. Only after we had noted this in our statement of 3 August (ENDC/PV.220, p.9) did the representative of the United States squeeze out a few words to the effect that the United States does not at all refuse -- and I quote his words -

"... to work for general and complete disarmament as part of our continuing effort to achieve a better and safer world through the application of the principles of the United Nations Charter". (ENDC/PV.222, p.46)

Having said that, however, the representative of the United States thereupon remarked that he gave priority to partial measures and not to general and complete disarmament.

Some of the representatives of the Western Powers who spoke here acknowledged in general terms the need for the urgent adoption of measures to reduce the nuclear menace. However, their statements in this regard did not go beyond a repetition of their old unacceptable proposals which not only are not designed to eliminate the menace of a nuclear missile war, but do not reduce that menace by one iota.

It is true that the representatives of the United Kingdom and Italy attempted in their statements to hint at the possibility of changing their positions on the question of general and complete disarmament, especially in the field of nuclear disarmament.

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Thus the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, Mr. Fanfani, after recalling the difficulties which the Eighteen-Nation Committee encountered on the question of the reduction of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, stated the following:

"The Italian delegation believes, and has always believed, that it will be possible to find for this essential question a compromise formula in keeping with the fundamental principles of disarmament". (ENDC/PV.219, p.17)

The statement of the United Kingdom representative, Lord Chalfont, contained the following remark:

"We believe, to put it more plainly, that much of the great nuclear armoury that has been built up in the East and the West could be destroyed without putting at risk the safety or the peace of mind of either side. That belief is based not upon faith or hope, but upon close and extensive studies upon which we in Britain have been engaged during the past months".
(ibid., p.8)

But so far these rather vague hints of the possibility of some sort of constructive changes being made in the position of the Western Powers in this important matter have remained suspended in mid-air and left without any practical development.

Those who are anxious for an early achievement of agreement on general and complete disarmament might wish to see in the remarks I have quoted of the representatives of the United Kingdom and Italy some readiness to seek to move closer to what lies at the basis of the Soviet proposal. I am referring to the proposal to eliminate in the first stage of disarmament all nuclear weapon delivery vehicles except for a limited, agreed number of inter-continental ballistic missiles, anti-aircraft missiles in the "ground-to-air" category and anti-missile missiles, and a corresponding number of warheads, which would be retained until the end of the disarmament process by the United States and the Soviet Union on the territories of those two States
(ENDC/2/Rev.1/Add.1).

But meanwhile it has to be noted that, after paying a minimum of lip service to general and complete disarmament, the representatives of the Western Powers in the Committee are not only not disposed to examine at the present time the problems of general and complete disarmament, but would like to shelve the discussion of those problems by insisting that priority in the Eighteen-Nation Committee should be given to the

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discussion of only two partial measures and, moreover, two or three outworn proposals of the United States which do not in the least eliminate the menace of a nuclear missile war. Such, we regret to say, is the unsatisfactory state of the negotiations on the problem of general and complete disarmament.

Now I should like to dwell on the questions of the liquidation of foreign military bases and the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territories of other countries. The representatives of the Western Powers -- I am referring to the delegations of the United Kingdom, Canada and Italy -- decided not to touch on this matter at all in their statements, while the representative of the United States, Mr. Foster, at the meeting of 10 August, hastened to denounce as "propaganda" the proposal to liquidate foreign military bases and to withdraw foreign troops from the territories of other countries. Mr. Foster asserted that United States bases abroad serve the purposes of defence and are almost a factor in the maintenance of peace (ENDC/PV.222, pp. 47,48).

But nothing is further from the truth than such assertions. The whole world knows perfectly well that during the post-war period the United States has set up a wide network of military bases on foreign territories many thousands of kilometres from its own territory as a military backing for the policy "from a position of strength" which the United States is pursuing in international relations, and so as to be able, by relying on these bases to carry out a policy of interference in the internal affairs of other States. The military bases and troops of the United States and other imperialistic Powers situated abroad are springboards of aggression, the sources of a serious and constant danger to universal peace and international security.

Recent events, and above all the United States aggression in Vietnam, the Dominican Republic and other parts of the world, confirm this in the most convincing manner. It is from the many military bases in South-East Asia, and from the aircraft-carriers of the United States Seventh Fleet, that the United States is undertaking barbarous bombardments of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and bombing the population of South Vietnam. It is unquestionable that the liquidation of all foreign military bases and the withdrawal of foreign troops would put an end to United States aggression in South-East Asia and other parts of the world. The implementation of this measure would to a great extent avert the menace of a thermo-nuclear war and would help towards safeguarding peace.

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The question of liquidating foreign military bases and withdrawing foreign troops from the territories of other countries is acquiring ever greater sharpness and urgency every day for the further reason that, in addition to the old imperialistic Powers -- the United States, the United Kingdom and others which have at their disposal a network of military bases on foreign territories -- other seekers after such bases are making their appearance. An active participant in this policy is West Germany, this being a new phase of the bellicose militarism of the ruling circles in the Federal Republic of Germany. The Western Press has recently reported that the Federal Republic of Germany is now constructing a large military base costing \$50 million at Baja, in Portugal, and plans to complete its construction by the middle of 1966. It is obvious that the construction by West Germany of its own military bases abroad testifies to the intensification of the warlike trend of Bonn's foreign policy.

There is mounting throughout the world an ever-growing wave of protests against imperialistic military bases as hotbeds of the danger of war and instruments of colonial policy. To quote a recent example, on 14 August the Head of the Government of the United Arab Republic, Mr. Aly Sabry, speaking in Alexandria, said:

"The British are well aware of our position: the base in Aden was one of the British military bases used against us in 1956. Nor can we forget that the military bases in Libya, Cyprus and Baghdad were also used against us at that time. Just as the Baghdad base disappeared, so all the other military bases surrounding us must disappear".

Not only do the statesmen and people of the United Arab Republic take this attitude towards foreign military bases, but so do the patriots in all the countries of the world, because all the peoples who have taken the path of independent development realize quite clearly that there can be no real, lasting freedom and independence in a country which is surrounded by a network of foreign bases, let alone a country which has failed to get rid of foreign bases and troops on its own territory.

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The experience of many decades, and in some countries the experience of centuries, has fully revealed to the peoples the real nature, function and status of foreign bases on the territories of other countries at the time when colonial empires were being built up and, subsequently, at the time when the imperialist Powers were fighting among themselves for the redivision of the world. Foreign bases on the territories of other countries have always served as bridgeheads or springboards from which the armed attacks of the imperialist Powers were carried out for the purpose of seizing territories and subjecting weak and small peoples to colonial enslavement, as well as for the purpose of keeping the seized territories and enslaved peoples under their control.

Nowadays foreign military bases on the territories of other countries are used for carrying out the functions of armed police in suppressing national liberation movements, and serve the purpose of imperialistic armed intervention in the affairs of other States. United States, British, Belgian, Spanish, Portuguese and other military bases and troops on the territories of other countries carry out the function of suppressors of the freedom and independence of peoples. They give rise to and foment incessant armed conflicts and provocations. The existence of foreign military bases and the presence of foreign troops on the territories of other countries in these days is the cause of the constantly increasing tension in international relations. One has only to take a look at the horrors, slaughter and destruction caused by the troops of the United States in Vietnam to get a clear idea concerning who needs military bases and troops on the territories of other countries and for what purpose.

Year in, year out we have heard from the rostrum of the United Nations the indignant protests of the delegations of the socialist countries and of the non-aligned States of Asia, Africa and Latin America, demanding the liquidation of foreign military bases and the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territories of other countries. And in the United Nations Disarmament Commission there was not a single delegation -- apart, of course, from the representatives of the NATO Powers -- that regarded the existence of foreign bases and troops in other States as a blessing for the world or as a factor of international stability. On the contrary, the overwhelming majority quite definitely described bases and troops on the territories of other countries as an abnormal phenomenon, as a dangerous evil which must be eliminated as quickly as possible.

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The discussion which has taken place in our Committee has also shown that many delegations attach great importance to the question of liquidating foreign military bases and withdrawing foreign troops from the territories of other countries and that they are in favour of a positive solution of this question. The delegations of Bulgaria, Poland, Romania and Czechoslovakia have clearly expressed themselves here in favour of liquidating all bases located abroad. At our meeting of 17 August the representative of the United Arab Republic, Mr. Hassan, called the question of liquidating foreign military bases an important aspect of disarmament (ENDC/PV.224, p.8) and reminded us of the decisions (A/5763) of the Second Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries in Cairo which denounced these foreign bases as dangerous and called for their liquidation. At our 223rd meeting Mr. Trivedi also expressed himself in favour of examining, among other problems, the question of liquidating foreign bases and withdrawing foreign troops from the territories of other countries.

What is the problem now? It is that the Western Powers should abandon their imperialistic position, pay heed to the opinion of the overwhelming majority of the countries of the world, and set about liquidating their military bases abroad and evacuating the troops which they have sent into the territories of other countries. The Soviet delegation, guided by the interests of safeguarding peace, once again urges the Eighteen-Nation Committee to discuss this question and to take measures for the immediate withdrawal of foreign troops from South Vietnam, Taiwan, the Congo, South Korea and Malaysia, and also, of course, from the territories of European States and other parts of the world. We suggest bringing about the liquidation of all military bases on foreign territories and, in particular, the United States base at Guantanamo in Cuba and its bases in other parts of the world. Such decisions could really put a stop to the dangerous development of events in the world and would have a most favourable impact on the overall world situation and on the solution of all other problems.

In the statements of the representatives of many countries in our Committee we hear an ever louder note of alarm at the growing threat of a nuclear missile war. All those who genuinely cherish the cause of peace and disarmament speak in favour of the proposal to ban the use of nuclear weapons as a first essential step towards liquidating the stockpiles of these monstrous weapons of mass destruction. The proposal to prohibit the use of nuclear weapons which was first put forward by Ethiopia A/RES/1653 (XVI), 1909 (XVIII)--a country which is taking part in the work of our Committee with a high sense of responsibility--has today become the demand of hundreds of millions of people, the demand of most of the countries of the world.

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From the point of view of international law, and from the point of view of the feelings, hopes and demands prevailing in the world, the banning of the use of nuclear weapons is certainly the problem most ripe for solution. In this connexion the turning-point was the adoption by an overwhelming majority, at the sixteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly four years ago, of a resolution in which it is solemnly proclaimed that -

"(a) The use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons is contrary to the spirit, letter and aims of the United Nations and, as such, a direct violation of the Charter of the United Nations;

"(b) The use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons would exceed even the scope of war and cause indiscriminate suffering and destruction to mankind and civilization and, as such, is contrary to the rules of international law and to the laws of humanity;

"(c) The use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons in a war is directed not against an enemy or enemies alone but also against mankind in general, since the peoples of the world not involved in such a war will be subjected to all the evils generated by the use of such weapons;

"(d) Any State using nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons is to be considered as violating the Charter of the United Nations, as acting contrary to the laws of humanity and as committing a crime against mankind and civilization" (A/RES/1653(XVI))

That is the resolution adopted by the General Assembly at its sixteenth session. That solemn declaration of the General Assembly must be regarded as the supreme moral law. All States must bring their actions into harmony with the principles set forth therein.

It should also be noted that the tremendous yearning in the world that nuclear weapons should never again be used has been reflected in statements by many public as well as religious leaders throughout the world. Pope Paul VI of Rome, speaking recently on the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of the destruction of the Japanese city of Hiroshima by an American atomic bomb, said that the bombing of Hiroshima was a "diabolical slaughter" and a "criminal challenge to civilization." Pope Paul called for a ban on "shameful weapons", that is, nuclear and thermo-nuclear bombs. Here are words to which the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom should listen. I quote from Pope Paul's statement:

"We pray that the world will never again see such a disastrous day as that on which Hiroshima was bombed; that people will never again base their trust, calculations and prestige on such a destructive and shameful weapon."

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Pope Paul went on:

"We pray that such death-dealing weapons have not killed world peace even in attempting to achieve it, nor impaired for ever the honour of science nor extinguished the serenity of life on earth."

It is legitimate to put the question: do the United States, the United Kingdom and their NATO allies, whose representatives here talk so much about their allegiance to the principles and purposes of the United Nations Charter, respect the clearly-expressed opinion of the majority of the countries of the world in regard to banning the use of nuclear weapons? Unfortunately their whole position testifies to the very opposite.

As we all know, at the sixteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly the United States and the United Kingdom voted against the adoption of the declaration on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons; and subsequently, both at sessions of the General Assembly and in the Eighteen-Nation Committee, they have sabotaged in every way the solution of this important and urgent question. And now, at this session of the Committee, Mr. Foster has again said "No" to the proposal to ban the use of nuclear weapons. Moreover, the United States and the United Kingdom are unwilling to accept even such an elementary measure as that proposed by the Soviet Union: namely that, even before the conclusion of an agreement on the banning of the use of nuclear weapons, the nuclear States should declare that they would not be the first to use such weapons (A/5827 and Corr. 1). In adopting such a position the Western Powers are challenging the whole world and threatening mankind with a nuclear holocaust.

The Soviet delegation would like to dwell especially on one question which is casting its ominous shadow over the political situation in Europe and is hampering the disarmament negotiations. I am referring to the situation in West Germany and what is now going on there, and the slogans under which the election campaign is being carried out. The voices of militarists and avowed revanchists are heard in West Germany the loudest of all. They are silencing all others: one cannot hear the voices of those who support a policy of peace and are fighting against a new upsurge of militarism in West Germany and against the arming of West Germany.

Whereas the general tendency in the development of international relations today is characterized and determined by a movement towards disarmament and, in the first place,

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towards nuclear disarmament and the peaceful coexistence of peoples, West Germany is moving in just the opposite direction. It has again taken the disastrous path of militarism and revanchism. Today from West Germany we hear ever more insistent claims that the Bundeswehr should be given access to nuclear weapons. Any delay in satisfying these West German nuclear claims is called by Dr. Adenauer a "tragedy for the Germans", and plans for agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons are called "monstrous". Strauss cries out that this would be a "nightmare" for West Germany.

The mere fact of the Geneva disarmament negotiations upsets the West German revanchists: it is well known that not a single proposal on disarmament or for putting an end to the arms race has ever come from Bonn. The whole policy of the ruling circles in Bonn is aimed at intensifying the arms race and at increasing international tension. Today in the Press we read a statement by the leader of the West German revanchists, the Chairman of the Christian Democratic Party, Dr. Adenauer. I quote these words of Adenauer's:

"It would be better for everybody if the participants in the so-called Geneva Conference on Disarmament were to pack their bags and devote their time to more useful and more important matters within the United Nations."

You see with what spite and hatred Bonn reacts to the mere fact of negotiations on disarmament! Is it not significant?

In general there now prevails in West Germany the same sinister political atmosphere as existed thirty years ago. The only things lacking are the bonfires to burn the products of science, art and culture, the torchlight processions at night, and the Führer. But Herr Strauss recently promised to produce for West Germany a new type of Führer for the purpose of arming the Federal Republic of Germany with nuclear weapons, and even something still worse, as he threatened the world in his article published in the Rheinische Merkur a few days ago.

It is obvious that the present ruling circles in West Germany, having set out to put into practice a policy of revanchism and bellicose militarism, by striving to secure access to nuclear weapons for the Bundeswehr, are heading for disaster. But what is particularly bound to alarm everybody is that the implementation of such a policy by West Germany will lead to a nuclear missile war which will bring disaster upon the peoples, make countless victims and cause incredible suffering and grief, monstrous destruction and tens or even hundreds of millions of irreparable losses of human lives, and for some peoples this war will mean catastrophe - complete annihilation. This must

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not be allowed. It must be prevented coolly, with complete lucidity of mind and with a full sense of responsibility for the future of all peoples, great and small, in the interests of maintaining universal peace and security.

Everyone must realize that it is not for the sake of any considerations of prestige that the West German ruling circles are striving to gain access to nuclear weapons. Their persistent demands in regard to nuclear weapons must be examined in the light of their revanchist policy, their territorial claims and their desire to change the status quo which was brought about in Europe as a result of the utter defeat of Hitler's Germany. There is no doubt that a conflict in the centre of Europe, which might be instigated by the West German revanchist advocates of nuclear weapons, would inevitably turn into a world nuclear missile war with all the disastrous consequences also for the peoples of other continents.

For this reason the maintenance of peace in Central Europe cannot be considered in a narrow context as a local problem; it is a vital factor for safeguarding universal peace and security. Consequently the proposals of the Government of the German Democratic Republic (ENDC/151), as read out by the Soviet delegation at the 222nd meeting on 10 August, deserve the most serious attention and support. In that statement the Government of the German Democratic Republic once again expressed its determination to support in every possible way efforts to bring about disarmament and a relaxation of international tension. Acting consistently in that direction, the Government of the German Democratic Republic has repeatedly confirmed to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament its readiness to accede to a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe, to conclude a treaty on the complete renunciation of nuclear weapons by both German States, and to agree on measures aimed at the reduction of armed forces and armaments in both German States.

The Government of the German Democratic Republic says in its statement that, out of a feeling of responsibility for peace in the centre of Europe, it reaffirms its proposals submitted to the Government of the West German Federal Republic that the two German States -

"- renounce the production, acquisition and use of nuclear weapons as well as obtaining control of them in any form,
agree on an arms stop." (ENDC/151, p.5)

The Government of the German Democratic Republic expressed its willingness to begin appropriate negotiations on these proposals immediately. In addition, the Government of

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the German Democratic Republic proposed that the two German States should join a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe. As you see, the proposals of the Government of the German Democratic Republic fully answer the purpose of normalizing the situation in Europe and maintaining peace.

But what was the attitude of the Western Powers towards those proposals? The United States representative found nothing more "constructive" to do than to avoid discussing them, on a far-fetched procedural pretext having no connexion with the substance of the matter (ENDC/PV.222, p.10). By so doing, Mr. Foster, you did not avoid taking up the question of the recognition of the German Democratic Republic by the United States. That socialist republic has successfully existed for fifteen years and is developing year by year, constantly extending its economic and diplomatic ties, and strengthening its international position. The point is that the United States representative avoided the discussion of concrete proposals aimed at maintaining peace and security in Central Europe and lessening tension in that important area of the world. That position of the United States is of course regrettable.

The Soviet Union insistently calls for an agreement banning the use of nuclear weapons. The implementation of such a measure and the abandonment by the Western Powers of plans to create a NATO multilateral nuclear force, the withdrawal of foreign troops and the liquidation of foreign bases, together with a declaration making Central Europe and other regions of the world nuclear-free zones, would fully answer the purpose of maintaining universal peace and security.

In the statements of the delegations in our Committee great attention has been devoted to the question of banning underground nuclear weapon tests. Of course that is an important question. Today the Nigerian representative, Mr. Obi, has dealt with it in great detail. Statements have also been made here on that subject by the representatives of Sweden (ENDC/PV.222), India (ENDC/PV.223), the United Arab Republic (ENDC/PV.224) and Mexico (ibid.). They have put forward a number of important ideas and considerations in that regard. Their statements reflect the determination of those countries to do everything possible for help bring about an early agreement on the banning of underground nuclear tests and to contribute to that cause.

However, the Western participants in the negotiations have, as in the past, been keeping to their old position, which blocks any progress in solving the problem of underground nuclear tests. One after another they have reasserted the familiar demand for the institution of international inspection--a demand which deviates from the

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conditions of the Moscow partial test-ban Treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1) and makes agreement on this question impracticable. There is every reason to believe that the United States is deliberately putting forward obviously unacceptable conditions in order to keep its hands free to continue conducting a series of underground tests. The only thing we can do in these circumstances is to address an urgent appeal to the United States to accept the conditions for the cessation of nuclear weapon tests that are laid down in the Moscow Treaty for the three environments so as to cover underground tests as well.

At the meeting of the Committee held on 17 August the Soviet delegation put the following question to the representative of the United States:

"... does the draft treaty tabled [on 17 August] ... provide for the complete and unconditional prohibition of access to nuclear weapons, whether in a direct way, that is through national ownership, control or disposal, or in an indirect way, that is access to nuclear weapons through a so-called NATO multilateral force and such like? In other words, are we to understand the United States draft as precluding any possibility of the establishment of a NATO multilateral or similar force with the participation, in one form or another, of military or other personnel of the Federal Republic of Germany?" (ENDC/PV.224, p.40)

So far we have not received a reply to this question from the United States representative. However, on the very day that the United States draft was submitted Mr. Foster told Press correspondents that the draft did not preclude the establishment of a multilateral or Atlantic NATO nuclear force. Commenting on the United States draft on 19 August in the Committee the United Kingdom representative, Lord Chalfont, said:

"It is not part of its purpose to place an embargo on all arrangements for sharing the control of nuclear weapons within NATO or any other alliance so far as they are not disseminatory ..." (ENDC/PV.225, p.10)

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

These statements of the United States and United Kingdom representatives confirm our fear that the Western Powers are sticking to their old position in this matter.

In general it has to be noted that the discussion which has so far taken place both within and outside the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament on the question of non-dissemination of nuclear weapons shows that there is still no common basis for an agreement on this subject. It is obvious to everyone that in the question of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons there is a clash between two positions -- or rather two approaches to the solution of the problem, two conceptions.

The Soviet Union sees in an agreement on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons a practical means of really stopping the process of the continuous extension of access to nuclear weapons, whether through the emergence of new nuclear Powers possessing their own nuclear weapons, or through access to them in the form of participation in collective ownership, collective use or collective control of them within the framework of a military alliance or in any other way. Only such a solution to the question of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons -- one that does not allow of any loopholes or exceptions -- is of any value for the cause of peace. We have insisted, we insist and we shall continue to insist on this.

However, the approach of the Western Powers to the solution of this problem is different. Their main concern is not so much to shut off access to nuclear weapons to non-nuclear States as to bring the Federal Republic of Germany into the nuclear club through a NATO multilateral force or in some other way. That is precisely where the great threat to the security of the peoples of Europe and the entire world lies.

That is the fundamental difference between the solution to the problem of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons as the Western Powers would have it, and the solution as it really should be in order to answer the purpose before us: namely, to prevent the further dissemination of nuclear weapons in the interests of the security of all peoples.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

Unfortunately it must be noted that our Western colleagues do not treat the solution of the problem of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons conscientiously. They are concentrating all their abilities and energy on manoeuvring in this matter in such a way as 'to have their cake and eat it', as the saying goes; that is, to have an agreement on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons and at the same time to give the West German Bundeswehr access to nuclear weapons through its participation in the planned NATO multilateral nuclear force. The United States draft treaty to prevent the dissemination of nuclear weapons is a reflection of this kind of manoeuvre. The Western Powers must stop their manoeuvring around this question.

We should also like to stress that the proper solution to the question of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons requires that an end be put to the spread of nuclear weapons in any form, whether directly through national ownership or indirectly -- that is, through participation in a so-called NATO multilateral force and such like. National ownership of nuclear weapons and indirect access to them through participation in a so-called NATO multilateral force are two forms of one and the same peace-jeopardizing process -- the process of the dissemination of nuclear weapons, which we are striving to stop. Both these ways of disseminating nuclear weapons must be closed. No other approach can give us an acceptable solution of the problem. This aspect of principle should not be ignored by the Western Powers if they really wish this question to be solved.

Those are the remarks we desired to make at today's meeting.

The CHAIRMAN (India): I call upon the representative of the United States in exercise of his right of reply.

Mr. FOSTER (United States of America): Before I comment on the statement just made by the representative of the Soviet Union, I should like to say that my delegation would like very much to study the very thoughtful statement made this morning by the representative of Nigeria. I cannot say that we shall agree with all of the things he has said, but I do feel that his statement was a real contribution to our activities here, and I think his emphasis on the need for an energetic attack on many of these problems is a very useful reminder at this point in our discussions.

I shall reserve the right to reply later to some of the unwarranted accusations made by the Soviet representative against actions of my country. Let me say, however, that what he has said about Vietnam is in plain fact propaganda which does not flatter the intelligence of our colleagues at this meeting.

Our position with respect to the well-known Soviet proposals to liquidate bases and to ban nuclear weapons is well known, and I see no need to outline again the responses which I have made to those accusations in the past.

I have asked for the right of reply in order to discuss the Soviet representative's remarks about, particularly, a non-proliferation treaty. I should like first to correct the answers which Mr. Tsarapkin has now given to his questions of 17 August. My delegation has refrained from answering those questions before today because we thought that the draft treaty (ENDC/152) was itself the best source for his answers. Since the Soviet delegation had had no opportunity to study the text when it posed the questions, we thought that such an opportunity should be provided. We also thought it inappropriate for us to speak until the other delegations which had participated in drafting the text of the treaty had each had a turn to make their positions clear; and, as you now know, the representatives of the United Kingdom, Canada, and Italy have each had that opportunity.

In the light of what has been said this morning, however, I think I ought to set the record straight as to what the United States draft treaty does say in answer to those questions asked by the representative of the Soviet Union on 17 August.

Mr. Tsarapkin asked, first, whether our draft treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons would ban access to such weapons both directly and indirectly. By "directly" he said he meant through national ownership, control and operation.

(Mr. Foster, United States)

By "indirectly" he said he intended to cover access by means of a multilateral force or any similar body. He also asked whether the Soviet Union should understand that this draft treaty excludes the possibility of establishing an MLF with participation of military or other personnel of the Federal Republic of Germany.

First, let me answer as to direct access. Articles I and II of the draft treaty would clearly prevent the transfer of nuclear weapons into the national control of any non-nuclear country. They would also prevent any non-nuclear country from itself acquiring ownership or operation of nuclear weapons through manufacture. This means that I can answer affirmatively that part of Mr. Tsarapkin's first question having to do with direct access.

The other part of his first question had to do with acquiring access to nuclear weapons indirectly. Articles I and II of our draft treaty would preclude the transfer of nuclear weapons into the national control of any non-nuclear country "indirectly through a military alliance" (ENDC/152, art.I, para.1). They would also prohibit -

"... any other action which would cause an increase in the total number of States and other organizations having independent power to use nuclear weapons." (ibid.)

Thus no additional nuclear Powers could emerge, whether national or international. This much I can clearly answer affirmatively in response to that part of Mr. Tsarapkin's question having to do with indirect access.

The treaty would not, however, preclude the establishment of nuclear arrangements -- such as a multilateral force within NATO -- so long as such arrangements would not constitute an additional organization or entity having the power to use nuclear weapons independently of the participating nations presently possessing nuclear weapons. A new organization having such independent power could come into existence only if a present nuclear nation should voluntarily turn over its entire stockpile of nuclear weapons to a collective entity and should also voluntarily renounce its right of veto over the collective force. Even in the event of such a possibility, however, no non-nuclear nation could acquire independent power to use nuclear weapons under the draft treaty. This would be barred by the provisions which preclude any transfer into the national control of a non-nuclear country.

(Mr. Foster, United States)

I hope that every delegation here will understand why our draft treaty has gone to the trouble of including provisions to cover such a future possibility. We are not, after all, proposing a treaty meant for only a year or even a decade, but one which we hope will remain in force indefinitely as a barrier to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Yet, since we do have this long time span in mind, we are only being prudent when we take account of parallel developments that may occur in the political realm during the same time period.

We in the United States have watched with interest and profound satisfaction the revival of Western Europe from the ashes of the Second World War. A key factor in this revival has been the creation of new links of friendship and close co-operation among the countries of Western Europe, including those which before the war had a long history of enmity. This process of drawing together is still going on. As we all know, the West European States are themselves actively engaged in working out their mutual problems and in deciding on the nature and pace of their further progress towards greater unity. We here at this Conference cannot put ourselves in the position of impeding the political evolution of Western Europe when this has little to do with disarmament or, specifically, with preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. We therefore have every reason so to shape the language of our draft treaty that if at some time in the future the nations of Western Europe, or a substantial number of them, come to form some sort of political union they will not be confronted with an unmanageable problem because of our inadvertence here in drafting the text of a treaty.

We would not want to preclude for all time any new collective political and defence entity which might, with great effort and patience, be created over an extended period in Western Europe. We would not want to preclude such an entity from possessing and controlling nuclear weapons if it should in fact develop the capability to assume the nuclear defence responsibilities of its formerly separate national components some of which are now nuclear Powers. Such a development could indeed reduce the number of nuclear power centres.

It is obvious that Western Europe is hardly likely to find itself re-formed into this type of new entity except after a long course of development. Moreover, the new entity could not have independent power over nuclear weapons except with the approval of all -- all -- the participants, including the nuclear participants.

(Mr. Foster, United States)

In this sense the issue of the entity's future internal nuclear arrangements is indeed of "more theoretical than practical importance" (ENDC/PV.225, p.10), as Lord Chalfont put it in his statement of 19 August.

For all these reasons the contingency I have described is an unlikely one. However, this has little to do with the present problem of proliferation, that is, with an increase in the number of political entities in the world now having independent power over nuclear weapons. Moreover, it certainly does not and cannot justify any delegation on this Committee in invoking issues connected with Europe's eventual political evolution as a pretext for refusing to negotiate now on the basis of the United States draft.

As to Mr. Tsarapkin's second question, concerning participation by the Federal Republic of Germany in an MLP, this is not really a question before this Committee. Arrangements for the participation of interested NATO members in preparations for their own defence will obviously not be negotiated here. If the United States draft treaty should come into force, however, they will be fully compatible with its letter and spirit. This draft was arrived at after consultations with all NATO member countries including those interested in new nuclear arrangements within the alliance.

Any future decisions on nuclear matters by NATO members will take into account the fact that some of them are nuclear Powers while others are not. Personnel of the Federal Republic would participate on the same basis as those of, say, Italy or the Netherlands. No non-nuclear country would acquire nuclear weapons or be able to fire them on the basis of a national decision. Nor would any of them gain access to nuclear weapons design or manufacturing information either now or in the future. These provisions of the draft treaty reflect the collective decision of those NATO countries now exploring new nuclear arrangements within the alliance.

Therefore, if the Soviet concern about nuclear proliferation is genuine -- and I hope it is -- it should be allayed by the draft treaty and my explanation of its provisions. If, on the other hand, the real Soviet aim is to divide or weaken the NATO alliance, or to prevent the growth of political harmony and strength in Western Europe then we can never satisfy the Soviet Union. The NATO countries will not permit the question of their collective nuclear defence arrangements to become the subject of negotiation with the Soviet Union. They will, however, make a commitment

(Mr. Foster, United States)

to the Soviet Union that, because any defence arrangements adopted will be entirely consistent with the terms of the United States draft treaty if it goes into force, these arrangements will not constitute therefore nuclear proliferation.

It should not be thought that our effort today to answer Mr. Tsarapkin's questions implies that we have none of our own about the position of his country. On the contrary, the Soviet Union is also a mighty nuclear Power and it also participates in an alliance of States in Eastern Europe -- the Warsaw Pact. More than this, we know that the Soviet Union has in recent years turned over to the armies of its East European allies various short-range missiles which are capable of firing nuclear warheads. Yet we have never been informed about the arrangements which have been made within the Warsaw Pact for consultation on or joint decisions about the possible use of nuclear weapons. No Soviet statement exists, that I know of, in which the Soviet Union explains its procedures for supplying nuclear warheads to its allies to fit the missiles already given to them.

This is a very important part of the non-proliferation problem. I think that this Committee has a right to learn just how compatible with a non-dissemination treaty the Soviet Union's arrangements with its allies really are. Those members of the Committee who attended the recent session of the United Nations Disarmament Commission will recall that I put a similar question to Mr. Tsarapkin in New York. He has never given us an answer. I hope that we may soon be given his reply, and I hope that when it is given it will help us to move forward in our work.

Now, having given specific answers to Ambassador Tsarapkin's questions, I should like to comment more generally on his statement today. The burden of his remarks was that allied nuclear defence arrangements under consideration by some NATO countries would be incompatible with a treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and that the possibility of establishing any sort of allied nuclear force must be renounced before any treaty could be considered. Such a view simply does not accord with reality. In the light of the draft treaty which has been tabled it seems clear that the Soviet Union is placing political warfare ahead of the prevention of nuclear proliferation. By continuing even at this late date to advance such political preconditions, the Soviet Government would be assuming a great responsibility with respect to the welfare of the entire world.

(Mr. Foster, United States)

And in this connexion let us be clear about the real problem of military security in Europe. By no stretch of the imagination can the Federal Republic of Germany be considered a threat to the security of the Soviet Union or its neighbours. Rather it is the Soviet Union, with its many ready divisions in East Germany and its hundreds of missiles aimed at the territory of the Federal Republic, that gives the Federal Republic legitimate concern about its security. It is this situation, caused by Soviet military dispositions and not an alleged German desire for revenge, which explains the efforts within the Atlantic Alliance to create some appropriate instrumentality by which the non-nuclear members can participate in their own nuclear defence.

As I have said before, the danger of nuclear spread is world-wide and not the special concern of any one country. Let us, therefore, return to the essential task of eliminating that threat on a world-wide basis. If we abandon polemics and concentrate our efforts on the elimination of the real obstacles to the goal we are all enjoined to seek, then all of us will gain. If we fail, we shall all be exposed to this grave threat. It will matter little how historians may assess the blame.

I regret that at this late stage in our work the Soviet representative felt called upon to deliver another diatribe against the Federal Republic of Germany. At the United Nations Disarmament Commission session last June Mr. Tsarapkin said it was inappropriate for that body --

" ... to enter, directly or indirectly, overtly or covertly, into a consideration of the position of, and, a fortiori, to condemn, a State that is not represented in the United Nations ..." (DC/PV.99, p.36 of the provisional text)

Mr. Tsarapkin seemed anxious to protect the Chinese communists from any criticism, even if only implied. He wished to protect a régime which has openly denounced efforts towards disarmament, flouted the desires of mankind as expressed in the limited test-ban Treaty by exploding nuclear devices in the atmosphere, ridiculed peaceful coexistence and fostered acts of aggression; yet he still seems to feel free to continue his attacks on the Federal Republic of Germany. In this case the fact that the accused party is not represented in the United Nations or in our Committee and cannot itself reply to those attacks does not seem to bother the Soviet representative in the least.

(Mr. Foster, United States)

One of the basic objectives of Western foreign policy since the Second World War has been to work for reconciliation and co-operation in Europe and to strengthen the community of peaceful nations. The Federal Republic of Germany has a freely-elected democratic Government, and it seeks to have this right of free self-determination available to Germans in East Germany as well. From the ruins of the Second World War, and in spite of the imposed division of Germany, the Federal Republic has emerged as a source of economic strength for Europe and a provider of economic assistance to many countries around the world. It is dedicated to European co-operation and unity; it has publicly renounced the use of force to achieve its national objectives; it has entered into a commitment to its allies not to manufacture nuclear, bacteriological or chemical weapons and to this extent has already made an important contribution towards the objective of non-proliferation; it has forsworn a nationalistic military policy by integrating all its military forces in NATO and by placing them under NATO command.

The draft non-proliferation treaty (ENDC/152) which my delegation has submitted should allay any Soviet fears if they are truly genuine. If, in spite of that, the Soviet Union continues to refuse to discuss a non-proliferation agreement unless all plans for allied nuclear arrangements are dropped, we can only conclude that its objective is not the conclusion of an effective non-proliferation treaty but merely to use the issue for its own political ends.

The CHAIRMAN (India): I give the floor to the representative of the Soviet Union, who wishes to exercise his right of reply.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): I should like to reply to the representative of the United States in connexion with the remark he made when he tried to justify the militarization of West Germany and its efforts to obtain nuclear weapons by saying that there are Soviet divisions and hundreds of missiles in the German Democratic Republic. In this connexion there is only one thing to be said: namely, that only the Soviet Union has been proposing all along -- and I have spoken about this again today -- the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Central Europe and the removal of weapons also from that area. Given such proposals on our part and given the precisely opposite position of the United States, that argument of yours, Mr. Foster, sounds absolutely false.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): In view of the lateness of the hour I shall confine myself to a few brief comments concerning today's meeting, which in many respects has been very important and very interesting.

I should like to say first of all that I followed with particular attention the statement made by Mr. Obi, the representative of Nigeria. His very detailed and well-considered statement was notable for its wisdom and balance. Mr. Obi spoke to us about general and complete disarmament, the prohibition of tests and the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons. On the subject of non-dissemination, while emphasizing the need for broader action in which the nuclear States should participate directly, the representative of Nigeria seemed to me to attribute great importance -- as my own delegation does -- to the first measures, limited but immediate, which are necessary in order to gain time.

In this connexion I should like to thank Mr. Obi for the welcome which he was good enough to give to the ideas put forward at this session by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, Mr. Fanfani (ENDC/PV.219). The representative of Nigeria -- quite rightly, in my opinion -- strongly emphasized the need to gain time in order to make possible the achievement of broader agreements and more comprehensive arrangements. Such agreements and arrangements should follow from the first step, an initial commitment in regard to non-dissemination. These views are fully shared by the Italian delegation, which would be happy to count on the support of the Nigerian delegation in any efforts that may be made in order to attain this goal.

We then heard Mr. Tsarapkin, who chose to make a lengthy summing-up, reviewing the work of the Committee during the past month. The representative of the Soviet Union painted a rather negative picture in an attempt to lay the blame -- as was to be expected -- on the delegations of the Western countries. In order that the record of our debates may not mislead anyone, it will perhaps be useful if I reply briefly to Mr. Tsarapkin today, while assuring him that I shall study his statement most carefully, and reserving my right to intervene in the discussion again if necessary.

The representative of the Soviet Union first spoke about general and complete disarmament, and accused the delegations of the Western countries of evading this problem and refusing to discuss general and complete disarmament. I think one has only to re-read the verbatim records of our meetings to see quite clearly that this comment is inaccurate and without any foundation. In common with the other delegations,

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

the delegations of the Western countries have all reaffirmed the need for general and complete disarmament and the urgent necessity of studying this problem. For its part, my delegation has affirmed -- and continues to do so -- that the achievement of general and complete disarmament remains our main task but that, owing to the limited time at our disposal, it is essential that we concentrate our attention on what can be achieved rapidly in order to reduce international tension and facilitate the restoration of confidence. Moreover, that is the mandate very clearly given to us by the United Nations Disarmament Commission (DC/225; ENDC/149).

On the other hand, Mr. Tsarapkin was good enough to acknowledge that the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs had made, in his statement at the present session, some suggestions on the question of nuclear weapon vehicles (ENDC/PV.219, pp.17 et seq). But those suggestions have been left without any reply from the Soviet delegation.

From a closer study of the debates which have taken place in the Committee it seems rather that it is the Soviet delegation that has not paid sufficient attention to the problem of general and complete disarmament, engrossed as it has been in discussing particular collateral measures -- those relating to the liquidation of foreign bases and the prohibition of nuclear weapons -- although those measures were not specifically recommended to the Committee by the United Nations Disarmament Commission for examination.

In order to introduce once again some of his favourite arguments, Mr. Tsarapkin even had recourse to the words of Pope Paul VI. I only hope that if the exhortations of that eminent moral authority are so much heeded by the Soviet Union, they may also have some influence in the field of religious freedom in that country.

Mr. Tsarapkin then chose to renew his attacks on the Federal Republic of Germany, speaking about peace and security in central Europe. As Mr. Foster has just done, we must once again reject these unwarranted and defamatory attacks. We have propounded here the problem of security in central Europe in concrete and objective terms, giving the Soviet Union the legitimate assurances and guarantees which it is entitled to receive. If we understand certain security requirements of the Soviet Union and its allies, there should be similar understanding by the Soviet Union and its allies of the security requirements which exist on our side and which require a certain co-operation, a certain interdependence between the allies and NATO.

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

On this subject Mr. Foster's statement this morning clearly reaffirmed the principles and views of the West, which guide us in this matter. Once again Mr. Foster has given explanations and assurances of very great importance, and I hope that Mr. Tsarapkin will study his remarks more completely and thoroughly than he appears to have done hitherto.

Lastly, my delegation was awaiting with the greatest interest the reply which the Soviet delegation was preparing to give to the proposal for a treaty on non-dissemination put forward by the Western delegations. Last Thursday I expressed the hope that the interval for reflection which the Soviet delegation was apparently allowing itself might be due to the need to make a thorough examination of our proposals and to an attitude more favourable to agreement. Unfortunately, Mr. Tsarapkin's remarks this morning do not seem to confirm that hope. The representative of the Soviet Union unfortunately asserted -- if I understood him correctly -- that in his opinion there is no common basis for negotiations; and he called our proposal a completely useless manoeuvre. Those are very unjust words to apply to the effort made by the Western delegations in placing before the Conference a serious, comprehensive treaty truly worthy of every attention by the Soviet delegation.

I shall of course study with the greatest attention every word of Mr. Tsarapkin's statement in the verbatim record, to see if I can discover some positive indication, some opening, some possibility for negotiation. The reply given to us by the Soviet delegation today is not, I hope, its last word. Certainly this reply is not encouraging, but for our part we shall continue to make every possible effort to arrive at a non-dissemination treaty.

Ideas, like proposals, take time to achieve their aim. They work slowly. The partial test-ban Treaty suggested by the Western delegations took almost a year before it was signed in Moscow. That is a precedent which in some way is encouraging, even in the present case of our proposal for a non-dissemination treaty. Nevertheless, in the problem of non-dissemination the urgency is extreme. Any delay could be fatal; and, for its part, the Italian delegation believes that another effort really must be made so that this session of the Conference, which is probably approaching its end, should end not on a negative note but on a note of hope and encouragement.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 228th plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of Mr. Trivedi, representative of India.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Nigeria, the USSR, the United States and Italy.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 2 September 1965, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 1.5 p.m.

